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NOTES
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR HOME ARRESTS: THE KEY TO THE CASTLE: State v. Chavez

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Chavez, I the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether the warrantless entry into a suspect's home to arrest him
was justified by the existence of exigent circumstances. 2 The court upheld
the arrest. It relied solely on the exigency of imminent escape of the
suspect3 despite the weakness of this rationale and the existence of other
important factors. The court designated the police entry as "in the nature
of a hot pursuit." 4 In so limiting the basis for its decision, the court
unnecessarily widened the exigent circumstances exception. It thus set a
precedent which permits "the exception to swallow the rule. '" The court
very likely reached the right result but should have adhered to a 6more
thorough analysis suggested by other exigent circumstances cases.
This Note will provide the historical background necessary for an
understanding of the precarious nature of the warrant requirement for
arrests in the home and the consequent need for strict circumscription of
the exigent circumstances exception. Against this background, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals' analysis can be seen to tip the balance away
from the individual's interest in the privacy and sanctity of his home and
towards the governmental interest in effective law enforcement. Three
basic modes of analysis were available to the court. This Note will comN.M. -, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
1. 98 N.M. 61, 644 P.2d 1050 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 2. The New Mexico Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether defendant's arrest was a
routine arrest. If exigent circumstances were involved, the arrest was not routine." 98 N.M. at 62,
644 P.2d at 1051.
3. Id. at 63, 644 P.2d at 1052.
4. Id. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053.
5. James v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 87 Cal. App. 3d 985, 993, 151 Cal. Rptr. 270,
274 (1978). In James, a case cited in Chavez, the court prevented the exigent circumstances exception
from swallowing the rule by holding that the warrantless arrest of a robbery suspect was not justified
by exigent circumstances. The police were not in hot pursuit. The officers did not fear the suspect
was armed because he had not used a weapon in the robbery. There was little danger of destruction
of evidence because the defendant had no warning the police sought him. The court said that the
police should have sent one of the officers to obtain a warrant while the others remained to arrest
James if he left the apartment before the warrant was issued.
6. Chief among them are Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and People
v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976),
both cited in State v. Chavez.
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pare each of these to the court's approach and will evaluate their relative
merits as to their ability to strike the fairest balance between the individual's right to privacy and society's right to effective law enforcement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts and circumstances of exigent circumstances cases must be
carefully considered. 7 The court of appeals thus recounted the facts in
State v. Chavez in some detail. Abie Van Chavez, the defendant-appellant,
abducted his victim at about 10:00 p.m. He drove her in his truck to his
home. He beat her and committed three acts of criminal sexual penetration. The evidence showed violence, brutality, and torture which left the
victim permanently injured. 8
The victim escaped about 3:30 a.m. when the defendant fell asleep.
She was taken in by the defendant's neighbors. They called the police.
The police were dispatched at 3:34 a.m. After talking with the victim,
the police went to the house she had described. There they saw the truck,
which the victim had also described. The police satisfied themselves that
the house was the residence they sought by the defendant's nameplate
on the door. The door was ajar, as the victim had said she had left it.
The policemen rang the bell and announced their presence. There was
no response. They then knocked on the door, which swung open. Before
entry, the policemen observed blood on the floor and on garments. When
they entered to look for the defendant, they saw bloody sheets, newspapers, towels, and the victim's shoes. The police found the defendant
asleep in the bedroom and arrested him. The trial court later admitted
the articles found by the police into evidence. 9
The defendant moved to suppress this evidence at trial. He contended
that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Payton v. New York l0
required suppression because there was a warrantless entry into the home
to arrest. The trial court denied this motion on the grounds that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the defendant's home. 1
7. In other New Mexico cases, the court has carefully analyzed the facts and circumstances of
each case. See State v. Sanchez, 88 N.M. 402, 540 P.2d 1291 (1975) (exigent circumstances justified
police entry where police had probable cause to believe the defendant was selling heroin from his
home and kept a weapon on the premises; further, police heard people moving about after they
knocked and announced and thus had a good faith belief evidence was about to be destroyed); and
State v. Moore, 92 N.M. 663, 593 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1979) (exigent circumstances justified police
entry in "hot pursuit" of a suspect whom police had allowed to enter his house for identification
but who had not returned).
8. 98 N.M. at 62, 644 P.2d at 1051.
9. Id.
10. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
11. 98 N.M. at 62, 644 P.2d at 1051.
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The defendant appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The defendant argued at trial that the court should, under the fourth
amendment, exclude the items of physical evidence seized because the
search did not fit into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The trial court refused to accept this reasoning, stating that
2
there were exigent circumstances and that the items were in plain view. 1
The genesis of the New Mexico Court of Appeals' opinion was the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Payton v. New York. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment, 3 made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, prohibits police from
making a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony
arrest.' 4 The Supreme Court noted, however, the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. 5 It even observed that Payton's
warrantless arrest might have been justified by exigent circumstances.' 6
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that it meant the exigent circumstances exception to be carefully circumscribed. 7
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals offered one reason for
upholding the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances: the possibility
of the defendant's imminent escape. It distinguished the instant case from
Payton v. New York and State v. Devigne, 18 a New Mexico Court of Appeals
case applying Payton. In those cases, the home arrests were held invalid
because the arrests were routine. 19 In Chavez, however, the court of
12. Appellant's Brief In Chief at 2, State v. Chavez.
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
14. 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
15. Id. at 590.
16. Id.at 583. The New York courts, however, did not rely on the exigent circumstances justification. The New York Court of Appeals treated Payton's case as involving a routine arrest. Id.
17. The Payton Court did not specify "the sort of emergency or dangerous situation" described
in prior cases as exigent circumstances. Id. at 583. It did point out the New York Court of Appeals'
dissenters' view in Payton was that warrantless entries to arrest are forbidden except in "carefully
circumscribed" situations. 445 U.S. at 581. The Court also quoted Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443,477-78 (1971), which stated that searches and seizures in a suspect's house are per
se unreasonable absent some "well defined" exigent circumstance. 445 U.S. at 586 n. 25.
18. 96 N.M. 561, 632 P.2d 1199 (Ct. App. 1981). In Devigne, the police arrested the defendant
during the daytime in his residence two weeks after police obtained probable cause to arrest. The
court held his warrantless arrest invalid under Payton. Id. at 563, 632 P.2d at 1201.
19. 445 U.S. at 573; 96 N.M. at 561, 632 P.2d at 1199.
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appeals held the arrest was not routine because of the possibility of
escape

20

In determining that the arrest was not routine, the court relied in part
on People v. Ramey,2 a California case which defined exigent circumstances. 22 Elements of the definition which could possibly be applied to
Chavez include an emergency requiring swift action to prevent imminent
danger to life, to prevent imminent escape of a suspect, and/or to prevent
the destruction of evidence. The Chavez court relied on another California
23
case, James v* Superior Court of Tulare County, for its definition of

"imminent." It quoted part of the James definition of "imminent" as
meaning " 'about to happen';...

'ready to take place'; 'near at hand'.

S..24 The New Mexico court omitted other language from the James
definition, however, such as "impending," "immediate," and "threatening. '2This deletion is telling in light of the court's limited application
of the Ramey definition to the "imminent" escape of a sleeping suspect.
In State v. Chavez, the court explicitly discounted danger to life or
26
danger of destruction of evidence as bases for its decision. It relied only
27 The court reasoned that an imon the imminent escape of a suspect.
minent escape emergency is not limited to a chase situation, calling the
police action "in the nature of a hot pursuit." 2 8 The court stressed that
there only need be strong reason for believing an attempted escape was
at hand. The court noted that the defendant's truck was a means of escape
at hand and pointed out the posting of a guard at the defendant's back
door to forestall escape. The court concluded that the officers could
reasonably have believed that if the suspect awoke to find the victim29
gone, he might have tried to escape because of the violence of his crimes.
20. 98 N.M. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053.
21. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
22. The Ramey definition, which the Chavez court quoted, is that exigent circumstances involve:
an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent dangerto the
life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect
or destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether
such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation
must be measured by the facts known to the officers.
16 Cal. 3d at 277, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
23. 87 Cal. App. 3d 985, 151 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1978). See supra note 5 for a discussion of James.
24. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 273; 98 N.M. at 63, 644 P.2d at 1052.
25. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
26. 98 N.M. at 63, 644 P.2d at 1052.
27. Id. The court's indication that there was no claim of danger to life or imminent destruction
of evidence does not foreclose consideration of these factors. The state forcibly argued the dangerous
nature of the suspect. Plaintiff-Appellee's Answer Brief at 12, State v. Chavez [hereinafter cited as
Answer Brief]. In any event, the court's analysis could have departed from the arguments advanced
by both the state and the defendant when neither position sufficiently reflected the facts of the case.
State v. Moore, 92 N.M. 663, 665, 593 P.2d 760, 762 (Ct. App. 1979).
28. 98 N.M. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053.
29. Id. at 63-64, 644 P.2d at 1052-53.
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In reaching the conclusion that the officers acted reasonably in not delaying to get a warrant, the court excluded from consideration the difficulty
of getting a warrant at 3:30 a.m. and the fact that the defendant was
asleep when found.30
In focusing on only the "imminent escape" element of the Ramey
exigent circumstances definition, the court widened the exception to the
warrant requirement. The court's analysis shows the ease with which the
exception can be invoked in New Mexico, especially given the weakness
of the "imminent escape" rationale in this case. The defendant was asleep
when found. Police evidently were covering the front and back doors.
The defendant's truck was arguably in their control.
Reliance on this weak rationale alone is curious because the court could
have applied other elements of the Ramey definition. The state, for example, argued the defendant's dangerousness based on the violence of
his crime'. 3 In fact, the state questioned the constitutionality of resting a
finding of exigency on only a single factor,32 perhaps because it is a
"basic principle of fourth amendment law that searches and seizures inside
a man's house without a warrant are per se unreasonable"3 3 in the absence
of clearly defined exigent circumstances. Indeed, many of the cases cited
by the Chavez court rest on more than one element of the exigent circumstances definition."
30. Id. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053. Other courts have found such factors important. The James
court, for example, considered the fact that the suspect had gone to bed as an indication that there
was not an imminent escape emergency. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 274. The Chavez
court, on the other hand, said in considering whether there is an imminent escape emergency: "[Tlhe
issue is not whether the suspect was in fact preparing to escape; the issue is whether, on the basis
of facts known to a prudent, cautious, and trained officer, the officer could reasonably conclude that
swift action was needed to forestall an escape." 98 N.M. at 63, 644 P.2d at 1052 (emphasis by the
court). On the importance of the time of a warrantless arrest, see Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. Answer Brief, supra note 27, at 12.
32. Id.; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), cited by the state for this proposition.
Answer Brief, supra note 27, at 13.
33. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971).
34. Chavez was based on only one element of the exigent circumstances definition. Remarkably,
however, most of the cases cited in Chavez were based on more than one element of the exigent
circumstances definition. Leading federal cases in the area of exigent circumstances cited by the
New Mexico court include United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (based on the elments of
hot pursuit and imminent destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (based
on imminent escape of a suspect and danger to life); and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (based on imminent escape of a suspect and imminent destruction of evidence).
One of the cases from another state also contained two elements of the Ramey definition. Weddle
v. State, 621 P.2d 231 (Wyo. 1980) (based on the elements of reasonable possibility of dangers of
injury or death and likelihood of escape). New Mexico itself has based a finding of exigency on the
two elements of imminent danger to life and destruction of evidence. State v. Sanchez, 88 N.M.
402, 540 P.2d 1291 (1975).
The court, however, did cite cases based on only one element. In State v. Hansen, 87 N.M. 16,
528 P.2d 660 (Ct. App.. 1974), the finding of exigency was based on the sole element of imminent
destruction of evidence, although the element of danger to life was also present. State v. Moore,
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In Chavez, the New Mexico Court of Appeals tipped the balance away
from the protection of the privacy of the home and towards the protection
of society. Its analysis sends a clear message that warrantless arrests in
the home may easily be justified. This easy justification is contrary to
the rationale of Payton v. New York. The New Mexico court's analysis
reflects, however, the precarious nature of the right expounded in Payton
to be free from warrantless intrusions into the home. The history of the
warrant requirement for home arrests further reveals the tenuous nature
of this right. The ease with which this right can be lost has led courts to
three basic modes of analysis to protect it: the atomistic, the definitional,
and the holistic.35 A comparison of each of these modes to the New
Mexico court's approach suggests that the court should adhere to a thorough definitional analysis to strike a true balance between the right to
individual privacy and the right of society to effective law enforcement.
The following discussion will first consider the historical background of
warrantless home arrests and then will proceed to the modes of analysis
available to the New Mexico court.
A. Historical Perspective
In deciding that warrantless routine home arrests are unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York surveyed the authorities from
the time of the framing of the Constitution to the present. This survey
revealed the division of opinion on the constitutionality of warrantless
entries into the home to arrest.
Three distinct views were expressed by the common law commentators
relied on by the framers of the fourth amendment. 3 6 Lord Coke clearly
saw warrantless entry into the home to arrest as illegal. Only the King's
indictment could justify forced entry to effect an arrest founded on sus92 N.M. 663, 593 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1979), was based on the danger of imminent escape. Moore,
however, was a "pure" example of "hot pursuit." The police in Moore sought a suspect who knew
the police sought him and was actively fleeing. Unlike Moore, the entry in Chavez was described
as "in the nature of a hot pursuit," 98 N.M. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053, because Chavez had not been
alerted nor was he fleeing.
In a case decided subsequent to Chavez, State v. Pool, 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 5123 (Sept. 16,
1982), the New Mexico Court of Appeals, citing the Ramey definition, based its holding in part on
the exigent circumstance of imminent destruction of evidence. Id. at 1526. In Pool, the defendant
answered a knock at his motel room door to find a policeman and the motel manager. They had
come to evict a trespasser. The policeman smelled marijuana. The defendant quickly shut the door.
Id. at 1524. The court found the policeman's warrantless entry justified because of his good faith
belief that contraband was about to be destroyed. Id. at 1525-26. Although the court did not mention
it, there was also an element of hot pursuit in the officer's entry immediately after the defendant's
retreat into the motel room.
35. Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstancesfor a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev.
90 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Donnino & Giresel. Donnino and Girese actually used the term
"qualitative" to refer to the atomistic mode. Id. at 99. This Note will use the term "atomistic" to
emphasize the contrast with "holistic."
36. 445 U.S. at 593-94.
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picion. Not even a warrant issued by a justice of the peace would suffice.37
East and Russell believed an officer had to have a magistrate's warrant.3"
Blackstone, on the other hand, thought warrantless arrests were legal.39
Thus, reliance on the major common law commentators for an indication
of the framers' view is impossible, for they appear to have been closely
divided. 40 Part of the reason for their divergence was the difficulty of
reconciling the sanctity of the home and the preeminent demands of the
king. 4' Two maxims reflected the dichotomy: 42 "Every man's house is
his castle," 43 and "The king's keys unlock all doors."44 Though the former
only to civil actions, "its cautionary impact...
was strictly applicable
' 45
was substantial.
Nor is the modem perspective any clearer. At the time Payton v. New
York was decided, five of the seven United States Courts of Appeals
which had considered the question had held warrantless home arrests
unconstitutional. 46 State law was also divided. Twenty-three states authorized warrantless home arrests by statute, and one state by judicial
decision. 47 Fifteen states clearly prohibited them, 4 ten of these on constitutional grounds. 49 Eleven states had taken no position.5 0
The Payton Court noted, however, a "significant decline" in recent
years of the number of states permitting warrantless entries for arrest."
The Court emphasized the strength of the "trend" by pointing to recent
holdings of seven state courts that warrantless home arrests violated their
their decisions from review by the
state constitutions, thus immunizing
52
Court.
Supreme
States
United
37. Id. at 594 n. 37 (citing 4 E. Coke, Institutes * 177).
38. 445 U.S. at 595 n. 39 (citing 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 322 (1806), and 1 W. Russell,
A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 745 (1819)).
39. 445 U.S. at 595 n. 40 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 292).
40. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 593; Comment, The Constitutionalityof WarrantlessHome
Arrests, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1550, 1553 (1978).
41. Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the
Castle, 82 Dick. L. Rev. 167, 168 n.5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, ForcibleEntry]; see
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 800 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Wilgus].
42.. Comment, Forcible Entry, supra note 41, at 168 n. 5.
43. Id. (quoting Broom's Legal Maxims * 417).
44. Wilgus, supra note 41, at 800.
45. Comment, ForcibleEntry, supra note 41, at 168 n. 5; see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
598 (The Supreme Court said that this maxim "strongly suggests that the prevailing practice was
not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when authorized by a warrant").
46. The Court lists the circuit courts' decisions in footnote 4. 445 U.S. at 575 n. 4. The Tenth
Circuit had upheld a warrantless home arrest without discussing the constitutional issue. Michael v.
United States, 393 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1968).
47. 445 U.S. at598 n. 46.
48. Id. at598.
49. Id. at599 n. 47.
50. Id. at 598. New Mexico was among these states. Id. at 599 n. 48.
51. Id. at 599.
52. Id. at 600.
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The Payton Court's reliance on the "trend" is understandable in light
of the somewhat indefinite standard of reasonableness required by the
fourth amendment and in light of the necessity for "custom and contemporary norms" as elements of constitutional analysis.53 There being "by
no means the kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present

• .. with regard to warrantless arrests in public places," 54 the Payton

Court decided at least in part on the basis of the trend. It also found that
"the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic" 55 made warrantless
home arrests unconstitutional. The keys to the castle seemed safe in the
hands of the citizen.
This use of "trend" as a basis for the Court's decision, however, as
well as the narrowness of the margin (6/3 decision), and the Court's
mention of the exigency exception, 56 makes the individual's grip on the
key less certain. If the "trend" relied on by the Court swings back to
return the key to the king, the exigency exception may well be the agent
for its return. Unless the exigency exception is applied in only a few
circumscribed situations, as the Supreme Court has indicated it should
be, 57 it will indeed become the "exception that swallows the rule." 58
B. Modes of Analysis
Courts have applied three basic modes of analysis in determining whether
exigent circumstances exist. These modes vary in the manner in which
they circumscribe the situation which gives rise to a finding of exigent
circumstances. No matter which mode is selected, when a person's right
to the sanctity and privacy of his home is overborne by the government's
53. Id.
54. Id; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
55. 445 U.S. at 601. In few areas of the law is the rhetoric more stirring than that surrounding
the privacy of the citizen in his home. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948) (absent "grave emergency," the fourth amendment interposes a magistrate between the citizen
and the police because "[p]ower is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their
own cannot be trusted"); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[flreedom
from intrusion into the home . . . is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth
Amendment"); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629,
636, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976) (Intrusion into the home by the police for any reason is a
"most awesome incursion of police power." That power must be restricted. "The frightening experience of certain foreign nations with the unexpected invasion of private homes by uniformed
authority to seize individuals therein, often in the dead of night," warns that this power should not
be in the uninhibited discretion of the police.).
56. 445 U.S. at 583.
57. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
454-55 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1947). "In its entire history, the Supreme
Court has upheld warrantless entry into a home in only six cases." Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock On
Any Door"-Home Arrests after Payton and Steagald, 86 Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220 n. 188 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Harbaugh & Faust].
58. James v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 274.

Spring 1983]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

intrusion to protect society, it is imperative that the court be explicit about
the basis of its reasoning. The New Mexico court failed to set forth its
reasoning explicitly.
The three schema by which the New Mexico Court of Appeals could
have analyzed the circumstances in State v. Chavez are the atomistic 5 9
approach of Dorman v. United States,60 the "definitional" ' 6' approach of
People v. Ramey, 62 and the "holistic ' 63 approach utilized by the Texas
courts. The New Mexico court implicitly recognized the first two of these
modes and applied the last one.
1. The Atomistic Approach
The atomistic or "qualitative" approach of Dorman v. United States
attempts to reduce the facts relevant to finding exigent circumstances to
a checklist that seems all-encompassing and easy to apply. 64 As in all
exigent circumstances cases, the particular facts of Dorman are essential
to an understanding of the court's holding. That case involved an armed
robbery at 6:00 p.m. on a Friday. The evidence, including probation
papers bearing Dorman's name and address, led directly to Dorman. The
police tried to get a warrant but could not because no magistrate was
65
available. Police entered Dorman's home to arrest him at 10:20 p.m.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court held the arrest was justified by
the existence of exigent circumstances. 66 These circumstances included
the danger to life presented 67by an armed felon, the risk of escape, and
the risk of loss of evidence.
In finding exigent circumstances, the. Dorman court propounded seven68
criteria that it believed useful in determining the existence of exigency
in any case in which the homeowner's right to privacy must yield to
society's right to the quick apprehension of suspects. 69 These included
1) the gravity and violence of the crime; 2) whether the suspect was
reasonably believed to be armed; 3) clear (not just the minimum) probable
cause; 4) strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises; 5)
59. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 99, call the Dorman approach the "qualitative" approach,
while Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 57, at 224, call it the "checklist" approach.
60. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
61. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 106.
62. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
63. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 109. Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 57, at 225, collapse
the last two categories in one "totality of the circumstances" approach. While such a category has
some validity, it is more illuminating to use Donnino and Girese's three categories.
64. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 99; Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 57, at 224.
65. 435 F.2d at 388.
66. Id. at 393.
67. Id.
68. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 100.
69. Note, Arrest Warrants Required for Arrests Within the Home-Payton v. New York, 30 De
Paul L. Rev. 207, 213-214 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Arrest Warrants].
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likelihood of escape without quick apprehension; 6) the peaceable nature
of the entry; and 7) the time of the entry. A late hour might underscore
the impracticability of obtaining a warrant and therefore justify proceeding
without one. It might also raise particular concern over reasonableness. 70
The state in State v. Chavez cited these seven criteria 7' and analyzed
its case in light of them. It pointed out that most of the criteria found in
Dorman were met in the instant case. 72 For example, the police in Chavez
were investigating- a grave offense, which involved grievous injury to the
victim. The state conceded that there was no reason to believe the suspect
was armed but pointed to the violence of the crimes as an important
consideration. Probable cause was not minimal but clear. 73 The victim
reported the crime and described the truck, the house, and the open door.
All of these circumstances supported a strong finding of probable cause.
Further, her identification of her assailant as "Abie" was confirmed by
the truck's front license plate, by a motor vehicle check, and by the
nameplate on the door.74 The probability was high that the suspect was
still on the premises. The victim had told the police that Chavez was still
there when she left, and his truck remained in front of the house. Though
no one was running, one officer testified that he believed the situation
was urgent, just as in a "hot pursuit." The police entered peacefully after
first ringing, knocking, announcing, and receiving no response. The poat about 4:00 a.m., an unlikely hour
lice arrived at the suspect's house
75
available.
be
to
for a magistrate
76
The New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to adopt the widely accepted
Dorman approach, citing it only in a passing comment on the lack of
anything in the record about the practicality of obtaining a warrant at that
time of night. 77 Perhaps the court accepted the view of some commentators
that the Dorman factors are a "conjunctive" list of requirements, 78 i.e.,
70. 435 F.2d at 392-93.
71. Answer Brief, supra note 27, at 9.
72. The state argued that the Dorman standards should be used as guidelines rather than as a
checklist. It cited United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that
not all the elements need be present to establish exigent circumstances. Answer Brief, supra note
27, at 10.
73. Answer Brief, supra note 27, at 10.
74. Id. at 7-8.
75. Id. at 10. It is not feasible to call a magistrate for verbal authorization in such a situation
because of the extreme difficulty of reaching a magistrate at 4:00 a.m. Telephone interview with
Judge Thomas Davis, Albuquerque Metropolitan Court (Nov. 16, 1982).
76. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 100 (the authors list cases in footnote 49); Harbaugh
& Faust, supra note 57, at 224 (the authors list cases in footnote 211); Note, Arrest Warrants, supra
note 67, at 214 (the author lists cases in footnote 54).
77. 98 N.M. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053.
78. Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 57, at 224; Comment, Warrantless Entr. to Arrest: A Practical
Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 I11.L. F. 655, 678 [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Warrantless Entry].
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that all the criteria must be met, despite the state's argument to the
contrary. 9 The court might also have been concerned that some of the
enumerated factors might conflict, thus requiring a weighing of their
importance, 80 or might be considered invalid when seen in the light of
subsequent cases. 8 Finally, many of the factors might exist when exigency
does not. The presence of all the factors is8 2irrelevant if the court decides
there was ample time to secure a warrant.
It is more likely that the court declined to follow Dorman because of
the fair criticism that it is impractical83 to require police to make "on the
spot decisions by a complicated weighing and balancing of a multitude
of imprecise factors." 84 The court may well have decided that Dorman
was too sophisticated to be applied by policemen forced to make quick
decisions in the field.8 5 The court in any event rejected the atomistic
approach in favor of a less confining mode of analysis, one that widens
the exigency exception instead of strictly circumscribing it.
2. The "Definitional" Approach
The New Mexico Court of Appeals seemingly embraced the "definitional" approach of People v. Ramey,8 6 another frequently cited exigent
circumstances decision. In Ramey, a defendant was arrested in his home
on the basis of an informant's tip. The informant said Ramey had received
stolen property, including a gun. The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana seized because it was in plain view of the arresting
officers. 87 The California Supreme Court held this arrest unlawful because,
absent exigent circumstances, a warrant must be obtained for an arrest
in the home. 8
In deciding the case, the California court defined exigent circumstances
as "an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent
79. See supra note 72; see also Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 106. The New Mexico
court did mention some Dorman factors (i.e., the development of probable cause, the brutality of
the crimes, and the likelihood that the suspect was on the premises), but did not identify them as
Dorman factors. The court used them only as support for its imminent escape rationale. 98 N.M.
at 63-64, 644 P.2d at 1052-53.
80. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 104. For example, there might be strong reason to
believe a dangerous suspect might flee, but a weaker reason to believe he was armed.
81. See Comment, Warrantless Entry, supra note 78, at 679, specifically mentioning that although
the defendant in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), was not armed, the Supreme Court
still upheld the warrantless entry to arrest.
82. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 105-106.
83. Id. at 104; Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 57, at 224; Comment, Warrantless Entry, supra
note 78, at 678.
84. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 104 (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(a),
at 390 (1978)).
85. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 106.
86. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
87. 16 Cal. 3d at 269, 545 P.2d at 1334-35, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
88. Id. at 277-78, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
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danger to life or serious danger to property, or to forestall the imminent
escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.-89 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals quoted this definition with approval,90 but it did not adopt the
California court's applicationof the definition.
The California court specifically tested each of the elements of its
definition by the facts of the case. For example, it found no imminent
danger to life or property. Ramey was arrested for receiving stolen property, a "non-violent crime evidencing no propensity for endangering life. " 9'
The court noted that the stolen property included a gun. However, it
found no reason to infer that the gun presented an imminent danger. 92
The court found that the defendant was not likely to flee. The court
mentioned a three-hour delay between the receipt of the informant's tip
and the arrest. The police made no effort to obtain a warrant, though the
delay took place in the middle of a week-day afternoon when magistrates
were readily available. This delay influenced the court to find that the
possibility of destruction of the evidence did not rise to the level of
exigency. 93
.There is "no ready litmus test"'94 for determining whether exigent
circumstances exist. Therefore, the California Supreme Court explicitly
measured the claim of an extraordinary situation by all the relevant facts
known to the officers. Indeed, that court went beyond its own definition
in mentioning the feasibility of obtaining a warrant. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals declined to follow this explicit analysis of all the facts
in relationship to all the elements of the definition. Rather, it limited the
basis of its decision to an imminent escape "in the nature of a hot
pursuit M95 even though other persuasive elements existed.
This limitation would have been more tenable if the "hot pursuit"
rationale had been stronger in Chavez. In two of the "hot pursuit" cases
cited by the court, a suspect was actively fleeing. 96 In Chavez, the suspect
was not actually alerted to the fact that the police sought him; there was
no "chase" involved. The court took note of this fact by saying that the
officers' actions were "in the nature of a hot pursuit." The court was left
with an "imminent escape emergency" which has usually been used in
89. Id.
90. 98 N.M. at 63, 644 P.2d at 1052.
91. 16 Cal. 3d at 277, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
92. Id. The police acted on information that Ramey had received an item of stolen property (a
gun) but probably no longer had it.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 98 N.M. at 64, 644 P.2d at 1053.
96. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40; State v. Cook, 26 Ariz. App. 198, 200, 547 P.2d
50, 52 (1976). Cook was subsequently vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court because the officers
in the case violated Arizona's knock and announce rule. State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d
877 (1977).
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conjunction with some other circumstance to justify a finding of exigent
circumstances. 9'
The court could have relied on other persuasive elements. The strongest
of these was that the defendant in Chavez could well have been considered
dangerous because of the heinousness and violence of his crime. Also,
the police could reasonably have feared the destruction of evidence if the
defendant had awakened and found his victim gone. This reasoning is
analogous to the court's conclusion that the police might have feared the
defendant's attempted escape if he had awakened and found his victim
gone. Finally, the court could have taken notice of the virtual impossibility
of finding a magistrate at 4:00 a.m. The New Mexico court, then, adopted
Ramey's rule without adopting its analysis.
3. The "Holistic" Approach
A final way of approaching the problem is to avoid any broad, allencompassing definition of exigency. The question is then resolved on a
case-by-case basis. This is the approach of the Texas courts. They rely
on a very general definition of exigent circumstances: circumstances which
made procuring a warrant impracticable. 9 A representative case, Jones
v. State," reveals that the courts recount the facts bearing on the finding
of exigency with care. The Texas courts then consider such factors as the
proximity of times of the commission of the crime and the arrest; the
availability of a magistrate; whether the suspect was armed or dangerous;
and whether the suspect was likely to flee. Therefore, the absence of
enumerated factors or an all-encompassing definition does not mean that
the actual criteria considered are very different from those of more formal
approaches. The court is freed from formal strictures and can focus its
attention on the important factors of a particular case.l°0
This approach is the one in fact adopted by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals. The court's recounting of the facts in such detail was necessary
because its holding required the justification of all the facts. 10 It was not
97. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Warden is commonly referred to as a "hot
pursuit" case, though the Court never used that language. In Warden, police traced Hayden to his
home within minutes of an armed robbery. They arrested him without a warrant; the Court found
that this arrest was justified because of the danger that Hayden might have used the gun against
police to effect an escape. Similarly, in Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231, 240 (Wyo. 1980), the
Wyoming court depended on the possibility that armed suspected rapists would injure police or
others if they awoke to find the victim gone and then tried to escape.
98. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 109.
99. 565 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
100. Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 109-110.
101. It is also arguable that the court's exhaustive listing of the facts meant that the court intended
to narrow the exigency exception by reserving the right to distinguish future cases. This argument
is weakened by the court's explicit reliance on the "imminent escape emergency" rationale. In any
event, such an exhaustive listing was consonant with a holistic analysis, with its incident confusion
to police and practitioners. See infra text accompanying note 103.
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just that the defendant might awaken and flee that concerned the court.
The defendant's heinous crime showed his dangerousness to society. This
fact bolstered the reasonableness of the police decision that they could
not "brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant." 1 2 The court's
constant reference to the facts reveals the influence of those facts on its
decision. It viewed the situation holistically rather than focusing on the
definitional element of imminent escape.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it provides less guidance for
police and practitioners than the more formal approaches.' 0 3 One reading
of the Chavez decision is that the requirements for the "exigent circumstances" exception are loose and are easily met. Under this reading, a
warrantless home arrest for any crime is justified no matter how late the
hour as long as probable cause has ripened and there is some possibility
the suspect might try to escape. In fact, though the court was not explicit
in its reasoning, it was obviously influenced by the heinousness of the
crime and hence the dangerousness of the suspect. Equally obvious was
the impracticability of obtaining a warrant at 4:00 a.m.
The court would have sent a clearer and more accurate message if it
had embraced Ramey's analysis as well as its definition of exigent circumstances. The definitional approach is superior to both the atomistic
and holistic approaches. It protects the privacy interest of the individual
because it explicitly narrows the range of circumstances in which the
police can invade the home. At the same time, it is understandable to
police and practitioners and is flexible enough to allow for the protection
of society.
CONCLUSION
The tension between the individual's interest in the privacy of his home
and the governmental interest in effective law enforcement is at the heart
of warrantless home arrest cases. The framers of the fourth amendment
provided for the general resolution of this tension by interposing a warrant
requirement between the public and the police in all but a few carefully
circumscribed situations.' 0" Payton v. New York settled the question of
whether the fourth amendment prohibited warrantless home arrests. Payton held that the fourth amendment "has drawn a firm line at the entrance
to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."' 05 In State v. Chavez, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the exigent circumstances exception
102.
103.
104.
States,
105.

Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (1970).
Donnino & Girese, supra note 35, at 110.
See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
445 U.S. at 576.
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justified the warrantless nighttime entry to arrest the suspect. Many of
the elements traditionally relied on to show the existence of exigent
circumstances were present in State v. Chavez. The court ignored or
discounted all of them, however, except for the possibility of imminent
escape. It is questionable that this element alone was strong enough to
justify a finding of exigency in this case. In unnecessarily limiting the
basis for its decision, the court sent the message that the exigent circumstances requirement is more a loophole than a carefully circumscribed
exception to the general warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
KELLY HOOPER BURNHAM

